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If this reasoning commends itself to the bench in those provinces which have similar legislation, and if Rookes v. Barnard is
also accepted as authority on the nature of the illegality involved
in a breach of contract, it may mean, for instance, that any strike
in which even one striker breaches a contract of service will subject
union officials to an action for damages. Rookes v. Barnard must
mean that a single contract breached or threatened can visit with
illegality all those acting in combination. Since all wage negotiations carry an implied threat to strike it may be worth conjecturing
what the position will be in law where it is obvious that any strike
would involve a breach of some contract of service. Is every nonstriking labourer who loses wages., every customer who loses his
advantageous source of provisions and, indeed, every employer
who is damaged by strike action to have an action in tort on this
new basis? Nor is there any reason to think that the possibilities
are confined to the field of labour law.
The Canadian courts may well consider it more conducive to
a desirable predictability in the law to refuse to follow the House
of Lords. There is little need in Canadian law of this new big stick
with which to beat the unions ."
INNIS CHRISTIE *

CONFLICT OF LAWS-ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE-JURISDICTION
OF BRITISH COLUMBIA COURT TO DECLARE MARRIAGE VOID BASED
ON DOMICILE AND RESIDENCE OF PETITIONER- STARE DECISIS . -

In Savelieff v. Glouchkoff l the petitioner, the husband, resident

and domiciled in British Columbia, sought a declaration that his
marriage in the City of Algiers to the respondent wife was void
by reason of her prior and subsisting marriage . At the time of the
petition the respondent was resident and domiciled in Ontario.
the protection of section 3 of the Trade Disputes Act, 1906. Such was the
decision of the majority in J. T. Stratford and Son Ltd. v. Lindley, [19641
the Times, March 26th, a clear attempt by the Court of Appeal to cut
down the wide sweep of the House of Lords' judgments in Rookes v.
Barnard, supra, footnote 1 . In Canada, the trade union official could be
held liable for "inducing breach of contract", if the stringent requirements
of that tort were satisfied . See D . C. Thompson and Son Ltd. v . Deakin,
supra, footnote 17 .
71 1 am much indebted to Mr. K . W . Wedderburn for discussion on
Rookes v . Barnard. See also (1964), 27 Mod . L. Rev . 257 .
*Innis Christie, of The Faculty of Law, Queen's University, Kingston,
Ontario .
1 (1963), 41 D.L .R. 768 (B .C .) .
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The court dismissed the action for want of jurisdiction on the
ground that the domicile and residence of the petitioner is not by
itself sufficient to confer jurisdiction. Hutcheson J. of the Supreme
Court of British Columbia, relying on Shaw v. Shawl and Gower
v. Starrett' was of the opinion that in that province the court has
jurisdiction to entertain an annulment action in three cases only :
where both parties are domiciled in British Columbia, 4 where the
respondent is resident in the province, 5 or where the ceremony was
performed there.' These three bases of jurisdiction are said to exist,whether or not the marriage is alleged to, be void ab initio or
merely voidable . It was also reiterated that jurisdiction cannot be
conferred on the court by the attornment of the respondent thereto where none of these three bases of jurisdiction are present.'
Hutcheson J. rejected Manson J's opinion in Khan v. Khan'
that the domicile of the petitioner is sufficient to confer upon a
British Columbia court jurisdiction to grant a nullity decree. In
that case the petitioner, the wife, was domiciled in British Columbia whereas her husband the respondent, was domiciled in the
State of Pakistan . She claimed a decree of nullity either by reason
of the informality of the marriage which had taken place in the
Pakistan Embassy in Washington or by reason of her want of
capacity.
In Shaw v. Shaw' the wife petitioned for a decree of nullity
of marriage on the ground of the impotency of the husband. The
wife resided in British Columbia but her husband was neither resi
dent nor domiciled in the province and the marriage was celebrated in Alberta. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
British Columbia followed Inverclyde v. Inverclyde 1° and dismissed the petition as the respondent was not domiciled within the
jurisdiction . From this decision appeal was taken to the Court of
2 [1946] 1 D .L .R. 168, 62 B .C.R. 52, [194513 W.W.R . 577 (C .A.) .
a [194812 D .L .R. 853, [1948] 1 W.W.R . 529 (S .C .).
4 See Salvesen v . Austrian Property Administrator, [1927] A.C . 641 .
e Cf. Ramsay-Fairfax v . Ramsay-Fairfax, [1955] 3 All E.R. 695, [1956]
P . 115,126 (C .A.) .
e Cf. Ross Smith v . Ross Smith, [1962] 1 All E.R . 344 (H .L.) discussed
infra.
' His Lordship relied on Gower v. Starrett, supra, footnote 3, at p . 861
(D .L.R .) .
s (1959), 29 W .W.R . 181, 21 D .L.R . (2d) 171 (B .C .S .C .) .
o Supra, footnote 2 .
i° [1931] P. 29 where it was held that a decree annulling a marriage on
the ground of impotency deals with a marriage that until the date of the
decree is voidable only and can be pronounced exclusively by the court of
the domicile of the parties. This case was overruled by Ramsay-Fairfax
v . Ramsay-Fairfax, supra, footnote 5, and acknowledged to be so by the
House of Lords in Ross Smith v. Ross Smith, supra, footnote 6 .
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Appeal . Although the majority of the court held that the trial
judge erred in holding that a decree of nullity could only be pronounced by the court of the respondent's domicile, it dismissed
the appeal since the respondent was neither domiciled nor resident
in British Columbia and the marriage was not performed in that
province. The reasons for judgment of Robertson (with whom
Sloan C.J. agreed) and Sidney Smith M.A. are based on Easterbrook- v. Easterbrook 11 and Hutter v. Hutter 12 and support the proposition that in a nullity action on the ground of impotency, the
court of the residence of the parties to the marriage would have
jurisdiction to declare the marriage invalid . Robertson J.A. pointed out that :"
The ecclesiastical courts did not exercise jurisdiction in nullity cases
unless the person cited was either resident or domiciled in the jurisdiction or the de facto marriage was performed there.
He also stated : 14
In my opinion, so far as jurisdiction over the parties to a marriage
void on account of illegality, or, void on account of impotency existing at the time of the marriage, but voidable, in this respect that a declaration might be refused under certain circumstances, is concerned,
there was no difference in the principles and rules applied in the
ecclesiastical courts .
Sidney Smith J.A., was also of the opinion that" for the purpose
of the exercise of the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts to
declare a marriage void all that was required was the bona fide
residence of the party cited within the appropriate territorial
jurisdiction, and continued : 11
From the foregoing considerations there would appear to be no authority in English law that residence of the petitioner alone is suffi11 [1944] 1 All E.R. 90, [1944] P. 10. In this case the petitioner in a
nullity suit on the ground of wilful refusal to consummate the marriage
was domiciled in Canada and the respondent was domiciled in England .
The ceremony of marriage took place in England and thereafter both
parties were resident in England . Hodson J. held that the court had jurisdiction to entertain the petition and rejected the distinction for the purpose ofjurisdiction between voidable and void marriages .
12 [1944] 2 All E .R. 368, [19441 P. 95. The petitioner sought a decree
of nullity of marriage on the ground that the ceremony of marriage which
took place in England had never been consummated owing to the wilful
refusal of the respondent. The petitioner was domiciled in one of the
United States of America . At the time of the institution of the suit, both
parties were resident in England . Pilcher J. was also of the opinion that
with respect to the court's jurisdiction there was no difference between
void and voidable marriages and held that it had jurisdiction to pronounce a decree.
13 Supra, footnote 2, at pp. 174 (D.L.R.), 60 (B.C.R.), 584 (W.W.R .).
l' Ibid., at pp. 172 (D.L.R.), 58 (B.C.R.), 582 (W.W.R.).
is Ibid., at pp. 177 (D.L.R.), 64 (B.C.R.), 588 (W.W.R.).
1G Ibid., at pp. 181 (D.L.R.), 67-68 (B.C.R.), 592 (W.W.R.).
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cient to found jurisdiction in suits for nullity. In my judgment it cannot be held to do so in the present case .
Moreover, I am of opinion that even if the petitioner had acquired
a domicile of choice in the Province of British Columbia, upon the
assumption that her marriage was void ab initio and that therefore no
matrimonial domicile had ever existed, the court would still be without jurisdiction . The authorities seem to be clear that while the court
of the residence of the party cited has jurisdiction, it has not exclusive
jurisdiction ; that there may also be jurisdiction in the court where
the marriage was celebrated and also in the court of the domicile of
both parties . But the facts in this case are not such as to bring them
within either of these other categories .

Bird J.A . reserved the point: 17
In these circumstances I do not find it necessary to deal with. the
question raised in the course of argument and founded upon the decisions in Inverclyde v. Inverclyde, [1931] P . 29, followed in Fleming
v . Fleming, [1934] 4. D .L .R . 90, at pp . 94-95, [1934] O .R. 588, at p .
592, as to whether, in a suit for nullity upon the ground of impotence,
jurisdiction does or does not depend solely upon domicile, since here
there is neither domicile nor residence of the respondent .

In Gower v. Starrett," the petitioner, the wife, sought . a declaration of nullity on the ground that the respondent had previously been married in Ireland and that his wife at the time of
his second marriage was living and had not been divorced. The
petitioner and respondent were married in Vancouver and
lived together for some time . The domicile of the respondent was
assumed to be in Ireland.
Counsel for the petitioner relied on Spencer v. Ladd ; Finlay v.
Boettnerl9 in contending that the court has jurisdiction in the case
where the petitioner is domiciled in the province . He also con
tended that jurisdiction exists where the respondent has attorned,
to the court, and where the petitioner is resident in and the marriage contract was entered into in the province. Farris C.J.S.C.,
stated
It would seem rather fortunate that the three points raised by counsel
for the petitioner are now definitely before the court for decision, as
confusion has arisen as a result of conflicting decisions in respect to
how jurisdiction is conferred on the court in respect to nullity actions
17 Ibid., at pp . 187-188 (D .L .R.), 75 (B .C.R.), 600 (W .W.R .) .
18 Supra, footnote 3 .
is [1948] 1 D .L.R . 39, Where Boyd McBride J. held that the Supreme
Court of Alberta had jurisdiction to decree the nullity of a marriage celebrated outside Alberta between the plaintiff, a woman domiciled in the
province, and the defendant who was domiciled elsewhere, where the
marriage was void ab initio because of the defendant's bigamy.
20 Supra, footnote 3, at pp . 854 (D .L .R.), 530 (W.W .R.) .
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on the grounds : (a) Where the marriage is void ab initio, and (b)
Where it is based on a voidable marriage .
In order that the Bar of this Province may have the law in respect
thereto clearly defined, I have deemed it advisable to confer with my
brother judges. They unanimously agree, after a complete examination of this judgment and full consideration thereof, that the findings
in this case express the law as they will apply it in like cases until
such time as the law is otherwise cited by a court whose judgment !is
binding on this court .
He then referred to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Shaw

v. Shaw" and said :22

The effect of the judgments of the majority of the Court of Appeal,
was in effect that I was wrong in holding in respect to a nullity action
in a voidable marriage, that domicile was necessary in order to give
jurisdiction. The court held that the elements to give jurisdiction in a
nullity action were the same whether the marriage was void ab initio
or voidable only, and further held that only if one of the three following elements were present, would the court have jurisdiction, the
three elements being : (a) Where the parties are domiciled within the
jurisdiction ; (b) where the respondent was resident within the jurisdiction, and (c) where the marriage contract was entered into within
the jurisdiction .

Farris C .J .S .C ., also specifically rejected Boyd McBride J's opinion
in Finlay v. Boettner 83 that the court has jurisdiction when the
petitioner only is domiciled within the province .
The court nevertheless held that it had jurisdiction to annul
the marriage on the ground that, being a marriage void ab initio, it
had been celebrated in British Columbia .
Farris C .J .C ., considered the decision of the High Court of
Justice of England in De Reneville v. De Reneville 24 but not that of
the English Court of Appeal." In that case an Englishwoman, domiciled and resident in England before her marriage, had married
in France a domiciled Frenchman and had lived with him in France
and French possessions for some years . She then returned to England and presented a petition for nullity on the ground of the incapacity or wilful refusal of the respondent who appeared under
protest and objected to the jurisdiction . The issue of jurisdiction
was ordered to be tried separately. Jones J." held that there was
Supra, footnote 2 .
Supra, footnote 3, at pp . 855 (D .L.R .), 531 (W.W .R.) .
24 [194712 All E .R . 112 .
Supra, footnote 19 .
25 [1948] 1 All E .R . 56, [1948] P. 100 and see J .D . Falconbridge, Annulment Jurisdiction and Law : Void and Voidable Marriages (1948),
26 Can . Bar Rev. 907 ; J . Jackson, Annulment and the Choice of Law
(1949), 27 Can . Bar Rev . 173 ; in general S. Ryan, Nullity of Marriage :
Jurisdiction, Choice of Law and Related Problems (1950), 28 Can. Bar
Rev. 964 .
26 Supra, footnote 24 .
21

22
23
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no jurisdiction and the matter came to the Court of Appeal . In
the course of the argument before the Court of Appeal it appeared that it was doubtful whether under French law the facts alleged
by the petitioner, if established, would make the marriage void or
voidable and the court decided to deal with the preliminary point
on two alternative hypotheses : one that the marriage was void
and the other that the marriage was voidable.
®n the hypothesis that the marriage was void and in view of
the fact that on this basis the petitioner was domiciled in England,
Lord Green M.R., was of opinion that the court would have jur
isdiction to decide the suit despite the fact that the respondent
was not resident within the jurisdiction . He said : 27
If, however, the marriage is by its proper law a void marriage, no
decree of any court is required to avoid it. The wife in that case did
not acquire the French domicile of the husband by operation of law.
She was free to acquire it or not as she chose, and, if she acquired it,
to abandon it or change it for a different domicile of choice. It is clear
on the facts that, if she was competent to do so, she did abandon her
French domicile (which I am assuming she had acquired) and that
she thereby resumed her domicile of origin, which was English . Her
domicile, therefore, on the hypothesis that the marriage was void, was
English . This at once raises a question as to the jurisdiction of the
English courts to entertain a petition for nullity by a supposed wife
who is in a position to prove that her supposed marriage was void
and that her domicile on that basis is English at the date of the presentation of the petition.
Lord Greene then referred to the decision in White (otherwise
Bennett) v. White and cited the following passage from the judgment in that case of Bucknill J. : Zs
It seems to me just to the petitioner, and also in the public interest,
that the petitioner, being domiciled and resident in this country,
should have her status as a single or as a married woman judicially
established by this court.
Lord Greene continued : 29
This view does, of course, theoretically at least, open up the possibility of conflicting judgments by the courts of the respective domiciles,
but, if it be not the right view and if the only court with jurisdiction
is a court in a country where both are domiciled, the problem ofjurisdiction based on domicile in the case of a void marriage where the
domiciles are different would appear to be insoluble .
After rejecting the view that submission to or not objecting to the
jurisdiction could found jurisdiction, he said:"
Supra, footnote 25, at pp. 60 (All E.R.), 112 (P.).
[1937] 1 All E.R. 708, at p. 713.
Supra, footnote 25, at pp. 61 (All E.R.), 113 (P.).
30 Ibid.
27
28
2s
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. . . if the marriage was void and not merely voidable, the fact that the
husband has protested cannot, in my opinion, deprive the English
court of jurisdiction to declare the status of a domiciled Englishwoman .
Conversely, if the marriage is voidable only, no such jurisdiction exists and could not be created by the fact, if fact it had been, that the
husband had not protested .

Proceeding to consider the matter on the basis that the petitioner
was resident but not domiciled in England, he assumed that residence of both parties to a suit is sufficient to found jurisdiction .
On this basis he agreed with Jones J., that residence of the petitioner alone was not enough to found jurisdiction .
In the result Lord Greene, with whose judgment Somervell
L.J., concurred, held that in the case of void marriages, but not
in the case of voidable marriages, where the wife before marriage
had been domiciled in England, the English court had jurisdiction
to entertain a suit for declaracion of nullity.
In the present case Hutcheson J. concluded that :
. . . if the grounds for jurisdiction in an action for a declaration of
nullity in this province as laid down in Shaw v . Shaw and Gower v.
Starrett are going to be enlarged to include domicile of the petitioner
within the jurisdiction as decided, so far as the courts of England are
concerned, in De Reneville v . De Reneville it must be so decided by
the Court of Appeal upon a reconsideration of their decision in Shaw
v . Shaw and overruling Gower v. Starrett in so far as it excludes as
an element giving the court jurisdiction the domicile of the petitioner
within the jurisdiction .

From the point of view of stare decisis, Gower v. Starrett" cannot be said to be an authority on the question of whether or not
the domicile of the petitioner alone is sufficient to give jurisdic
tion to the court of British Columbia to annul a marriage void
ab initio as in Savelieff v. Glouchkoff. 33 The ratio decidendi is otherwise . Gower v. Starrett stands for the proposition that a British
Columbia court has jurisdiction to annul a marriage void ab
initio where such marriage has been celebrated in the province.
The other statements as to the law of British Columbia are merely
obiter dicta. Furthermore it is only a trial court decision . Shaw v.
Shaw" on the other hand is a decision of the Court of Appeal and
clearly supports the proposition that the residence or domicile
Supra, footnote 1, at p . 773 .
33 Supra, foonotte 1 .
Supra, footnote 3 .
34 Supra, footnote 2. The British Columbia Matrimonial Causes Act
1857 (R .S .B .C ., 1960, c. 118, s . 6) provides that in all matrimonial suits
including suits for nullity of marriage, but excluding suits for dissolution,
the court shall proceed and act and give relief on principles and rules
which shall conform as closely as possible to the principles and rules acted
upon by the ecclesiastical courts in England .
al

8°
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of the petitioner is not sufficient to found jurisdiction in suits for
nullity on the ground of impotency.
The ratio decidendi in Savelieff v. Glouchkoff would appear to
be in direct contradiction with the views expressed by Manson J.
in Kahn v. Kahn : ab

The second point whether the court has jurisdiction in nullity proceedings or to grant a declaration where the petitioner only is domiciled in the jurisdiction raises some difficulty in view of two earlier cases
in this province. Apart from these cases.the over-whelming weight of
judicial authority and other legal opinion recognizes the right of the
court to assume jurisdiction in a case where the marriage is alleged to
have been void ab initio and any one of the following three connective
factors is present, namely : The domicile of either of the parties ; the
residence of the respondent, or the celebration of the marriage in each
case within the jurisdiction of the court. Whether these rules are
equally applicable to voidable marriages is a question which it is unnecessary to decide. Earlier decisions in this province have indicated
that there is no difference for purposes of jurisdiction between the two
types of cases and the more recent decisions in England have been inclined to favour this view, overruling the earlier case of Inverclyde v .
Inverclyde, [1931] P. 29 . . . . Having regard to all the cases and the observations made by the learned judges, I incline to the view that the
court has jurisdiction to grant a nullity decree where the petitioner
alone is domiciled within the province.
However, it is difficult to maintain that Kahn v. Kahn stands for

the proposition that the domicile of the petitioner alone is sufficient
to confer jurisdiction upon the British Columbia court to annul
even a marriage void ab initio since the petitioner claimed a decree
of nullity and alternatively a declaration that she was no longer
married to the respondent by reason of a bill of divorcement that
was given by her husband and was valid by the law of his domicile .
The court said : as

Unfortunately by reason of the expense involved evidence was not led
as to the validity of- the marriage performed under the circumstances
mentioned above in an embassy situate in the district of Columbia,
U.S .A. I have the gravest doubts as to the validity of a ceremony performed within the embassy other than in conformity with the laws of
the district of Columbia. Without pursuing the matter further, I am
satisfied that if the marriage was valid the bill of divorcement was also
valid . Alternatively, if the ceremony did not constitute a valid marriage,
then the petitioner is entitled to à decree of nullity. It follows therefore
that the parties are no longer husband and wife.

This passage seems to indicate that the case only involved the recognition of the foreign bill of divorcement. This interpretation
leaves us with Shaw v. Shaw and a series of conflicting obiter dicta.
11

Supra, footnote 8.

11 Ibid., at p. 176 (D.L.R.).
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In the field of matrimonial causes the courts perhaps should
place less emphasis on stare decisis and more on the necessity of
meeting present-day problems . Be that as it may, in view of the
difference of judicial opinion in British Columbia and the importance of the subject, it is to be hoped that the British Columbia
Court of Appeal will heed Mr. Justice Hutchison's request and
at the first opportunity reconsider the whole question of the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of British Columbia in suits
for declaration of nullity of marriage .
The question ofjurisdiction in nullity suits involved in Savelieff
v. Glouchkoff arises at an opportune moment in view of the decision
of the English Court of Appeal in Ramsay-Fairfax v. Ramsay
Fairfax a' and that of the House of Lords in Ross Smith v. Ross
Smith .3s
In the former case, the parties were both resident in England
at the time of the wife's petition for a decree of nullity on the
ground of her husband's wilful refusal to consummate the marriage and incapacity. The Court of Appeal held that jurisdiction
may be founded on residence where the ground for the decree of
nullity is one on which the ecclesiastical courts had jurisdiction .39
The court pointed out that the ecclesiastical courts based their
jurisdiction in cases of nullity on residence not on domicile. If
the defendant to a petition was resident within the local jurisdiction of the court then the court had jurisdiction to determine
it, which was the situation in Ramsay-Fairfax. Lord Denning
stated : '°
No one can call a marriage a real marriage when it has not been consummated ; and this is the same no matter whether the want of consummation is due to incapacity or to wilful refusal . Let the theologians
dispute as they will, so far as the lawyers are concerned, Parliament
has made it plain that wilful refusal and incapacity stand together as
grounds of nullity and not for dissolution : and being grounds of nullity, they fall within the old ecclesiastical practice, in which the jurisdiction of the courts is founded on residence and not upon domicile.
[Counsel for the husband] sought to draw a distinction between a
marriage which was void and a marriage which was voidable. He admitted that in marriages which were void, the courts where the parties
38
Supra, footnote 5.
Supra, footnote 6.
39 And also where the ground is an additional one now enacted in
section 8 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950, 14 Geo . 6, c. 25 as it was
the case here with respect to wilful refusal.
11 Supra, footnote 5, at pp. 697 (All E.R.), 133 (P.). Note that in the
All E.R ., Lord Denning is reported to have said : "The courts of the place
where the marriage was celebrated also may have jurisdiction, but the
courts where both parties reside certainly have jurisdiction" . This passage
does not appear in The Law Reports .
37
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resided had jurisdiction, but he said that in marriages that were voidable, it was only the courts of the domicile . However valid this distinction may be for some purposes, it is not valid for our present purposes . Take the case of impotence itself, which has- always made a
marriage voidable . The old ecclesiastical courts would certainly assume jurisdiction on the grounds of residence and not of domicile ;
and if they would have assumed jurisdiction, so should we also . Likewise with wilful refusal, which also makes a marriage voidable .

Referring. to Easterbrook v. Easterbrook 41 and Hutter v. Hutter 42
he said : 11

I am clearly of opinion that those two cases were rightly decided and
should be upheld : but Inverclyde v . Inverclyde, [1931] P. 29 was wrongly decided and should be overruled.
One word more. It may be in these nullity cases that the courts of
the domicile also have jurisdiction : so may the courts of the place
where the marriage was celebrated : but the courts where both parties
reside certainly have jurisdiction .

In Ross Smith v. Ross Smith, 44 the parties were married in
England in 1955 . In 1959 the husband being domiciled in Scotland and resident in Kuwait, the wife, who was resident in England,
presented a petition for nullity of the marriage on the ground of
the husband's incapacity or wilful refusal to consummate the
marriage . Karminski J. held that there was no jurisdiction based
on the place of celebration alone where the grounds for nullity
were incapacity or wilful refusal." The Court of Appeal reversed
his decision and 'held that the English Court had jurisdiction."
®n appeal, the majority of the Douse of Lords agreed with Karminski J. and held that jurisdiction in nullity over a marriage that
is voidable, as distinct from being void, is not conferred on the
High Court of Justice of England merely by the fact that the marriage was celebrated in England. Their Lordships felt that Simonin
v. Mallac 11 should not be extended to voidable marriages.
Supra, footnote 11 .
42 Supra, footnote 12.
Supra, footnote 5, at p . 698 . Note that in Ross Smith v . Ross Smith,
supra, footnote 6, at p . 354 (All E .R .), Lord Reid was also of the opinion
that Inverclyde v. Inverclyde, supra, footnote 10, was wrongly decided so
far as it refused to recognize residence of the respondent as a ground of
jurisdiction in a suit of a kind that could have been entertained by the
ecclesiastical courts .
44 Ibid., And see : W. Laley, Basis of Jurisdiction in Nullity of Marriage
(1962), 78 L .Q . Rev. 417 ; J . K . Grodecki, P . R. H . Webb P .S .C . Lewis,
Nullity Jurisdiction : Three Commentaries on the Ross Smith Case (1962),
11 Int. & Comp . L .Q. 651 .
45 [196013 All E .R . 70, [19611 P . 39 .
43 [19611 1 All E .R . 255, [19611 P . 39 .
47 (1860), 2 Sw & Tr 67 . In that case it was held for the first time that
by reason of the marriage having been celebrated in England, an English
court had jurisdiction to entertain a petition for annulment of the marriage although the respondent was neither resident nor domiciled in Eng41
43
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Lord Cohen said
I think it is too late now to overrule that case. I would, however, confine its operation to cases where the marriage in question was alleged
to be void. . . . There seems to me to be a fundamental distinction
between a so-called marriage which was void ab initio because, e.g.,
it was bigamous, and a voidable marriage which remains binding on
the parties unless and until the competent court declares it to be null.
In the case of the first class of marriage, if it was celebrated in England,
I am compelled by the decision in Simonin v. Mallac to hold that the
High Court had jurisdiction to declare it null even though the respondent is neither domiciled nor resident in England, but I see no reason
why I should extend this anomalous decision to the case of a voidable
marriage .
Lord Guest stated : 4s
It is said that because the ecclesiastical courts did not for the purposes
of jurisdiction draw any distinction between void and voidable marriages therefore the High Court should not . But there was no occasion
for the ecclesiastical courts to draw a distinction because their jurisdiction was founded on residence in both cases. And I accept that the
High Court has jurisdiction in relation to void and voidable marriages
founded on residence and that Inverclyde (otherwise Tripp) v . Inverclyde, [1931] P . 29 was wrongly decided .
I have already referred to some of the distinctions between void
and voidable marriages . The most notable appear to be these. In a
void marriage the wife, if petitioner, can go to the court of her domicile to have the marriage annulled . De Reneville v . De Reneville, [1948]
P. 100. In a voidable marriage she must adopt the domicile of her husband for the purpose of obtaining a decree of nullity . In a void marriage the decision depends on the ascertainment of a state of facts
instantly verifiable at the date of the marriage, such as lack of capacity
or of the necessary consents or duress . This challenge can be made by
third parties at any time. Where a marriage is voidable the decision
depends on supervening circumstances such as wilful refusal to consummate the marriage or impotence which may be quoad hanc and
therefore not ascertainable till after the parties have cohabited. A
voidable marriage can only be challenged by parties during their lives .
These are sufficient distinctions to show why if the court of the place
of the celebration is to have jurisdiction to annul a void marriage, it
should not have a similar jurisdiction in the case of a voidable marriage . The jurisdiction, in my view, should depend on residence or
domicile. This was the decision of the Court of Appeal in Casey v.
Casey, [1949] 2 All E.R. 110 although it is true that the members of
the court based their decision on differing grounds. The Court of Appeal in the present case would, I think, have felt themselves bound to
land. This decision has been followed in many cases both in England and
in other jurisdictions within the Commonwealth but in all the earlier
cases the marriage was alleged to be void and not merely voidable. See
Gower v . Starrett, supra, footnote 3.
49
49 Supra, footnote 6, at p. 360.
Ibid., at p . 383 .
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follow Casey but for the decision in Ramsay-Fairfax (otherwise ScottGibson) v. Ramsay-Fairfax, [1956] P. 115 which they considered established that for the purpose of founding jurisdiction in nullity cases
no distinction can be drawn between void and voidable marriages .
Ramsay-Fairfax did not concern the place of celebration but the residence of the parties. All that was decided was that residence gave jurisdiction in the case of void and voidable marriages which was an inevitable decision in view of the inherent jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts.
It was not until Hill (otherwise Petchey) v . Hill, [1960] P. 130 that
it was held in England that the place of celebration gave jurisdiction
in the case of voidable marriages . This case had been preceded by
Addison (otherwise McAllister) v . Addison, [1955] N.I. 1 where Lord
MacDermott, C .J. sitting as a single judge, held to the same effect .
In my view these decisions cannot be justified either in principle or on
precedent .
For these reasons I agree with my noble and learned friend on the
Woolsack that the decision of Simonin v . Mallac should not be extended to voidable marriages .

As for Lord .Morris of Borth-y-Lest, he was of the opinion that : so

If however, the decision in Simonin v. Mallac can be supported, I cannot find in it any good reason, for applying the jurisdiction so as to
cover one who is not domiciled or resident in England and who is the
respondent to a petition to annul a voidable marriage. Where there is
such a petition the court is being invited to bring marriage status to
an end and to do so with retrospective effect . If it can be said that by
marrying in a particular country parties impliedly agree to have "the
force and effect" of their marriage decided on by the courts of that
country I cannot think that any agreement should be implied which
extends beyond some agreement to have a decision in such courts
whether the marriage was or was not valid ab initio . The laws of different countries may vary in their provisions concerning the annulment of marriages which are valid ab initio : they may vary in their
provisions as to what ancillary relief may be granted in the event of
such an annulment . The particular place where the ceremony of marriage takes place may have no relevance as between the parties so far
as their marriage status is concerned assuming that the ceremony did
bring about such a marriage status . It seems to me that it would be
most unlikely that parties who enter into a valid marriage in one
particular country which is not intended to be the country of their
domicile or residence would intend that the law to be applied to their
future married status should be the law of the country in which the
actual ceremony of marriage took place and I cannot think that any
agreement to such effect ought to be implied . It has not been suggested
that the fact that a marriage ceremony takes place within the jurisdiction can be the basis for jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage.
If a respondent is domiciled or resident in England then there may
be a decree of nullity either if the marriage is void or if it is voidable .
so Ibid., at pp . 366-367 .
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It does not follow from this that if jurisdiction over a respondent in
nullity proceedings can be asserted for the reason that the respondent
has married in England the jurisdiction should extend both to voidable and void marriages . If the reasoning in Simonin v. Mallac can be
relied on at all it seems to me that its application ought to be limited
to cases where what is sought is a decree of nullity in respect of a
"void marriage" or, stating the matter otherwise, a decree which in
effect declares that some ceremony of marriage that took place within
the jurisdiction did not, for one reason or another, bring it about that
there was a marriage which ab initio was valid .

His Lordship seems to have overlooked the elementary and
primary distinction between jurisdiction and choice of law . Where
the court of the place of celebration takes jurisdiction it will not
necessarily apply its own substantive law to determine whether or
not the marriage should be annulled. The ascertainment of the
proper law in a nullity suit depends upon an analysis of the intrinsic nature of the alleged defect in the marriage . It is necessary
to separate the contractual defects of the marriage from those that
affect status . If the defect is one of form the court might apply
the lex fori which is also the lev celebrationis but in case of impotency or wilful refusal it might apply the law of the domicile
of the parties . In other words the answer will be given by the appropriate choice of law rule in force in the forum. The argument
that "it would be most unlikely that parties who enter into a valid
marriage in one particular country which is not intended to be
the country of their domicile or residence would intend that the
law to be applied to their future married status should be the law
of the country in which the actual ceremony of marriage took
place . . ." is not well founded and irrelevant as far as the jurisdiction of the court is concerned . The law of the place of celebration is not necessarily the proper law of the marriage . Again,
we are dealing here exclusively with a question of jurisdiction and
not the law to be applied by the court of the place of celebration .
There would probably be less objection to the jurisdiction of the
forum celebrationis if such forum were prepared to apply, wherever
appropriate, the personal law of the parties . It is certainly wrong
for the forum to annul a marriage on a ground not recognized as
sufficient by the proper foreign law .
The dissenting opinion of Lord Hodson is to be preferred to
that of the majority. He said in part : 61
I cannot find the distinction between void and voidable any more
satisfactory for the purpose of jurisdiction than that between one kind
of void marriage and another .
51 Ibid., at pp . 371-372 .
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Whether the marriage is void or voidable the question to be determined is always the same, that is to say, was it or was it not a valid
marriage . Leaving formality on one side the question will be, was
there capacity to marry?
The distinction between divorce and nullity proceedings is vital .
The one seeks to destroy a valid marriage the other seeks to establish
that there was no marriage.
With all respect to those who take a contrary view I remain convinced that the line of cleavage for jurisdictional purposes is between
divorce and nullity and not between different kinds of nullity proceedings . I see no justification for maintaining the distinction between
void and voidable marriages when jurisdiction is exercised on the
ground that the marriage was celebrated in England and rejecting the
distinction when jurisdiction is exercised on the ground of residence .
Lord Merriman, also dissenting, stated : 52
As regards the jurisdiction of the court of the ceremony, it has throughout the argument been sought to distinguish between void and voidable marriages . It is apparently conceded that the court of the ceremony may pronounce on void marriages, but it is argued that in the
case of voidable marriages it is otherwise . In my opinion, no satisfactory point of principle has been offered in support of this distinction . The distinction cannot be derived from the ecclesiastical courts
because the distinction was not recognized by these courts in connexion with jurisdiction . As far as my researches have gone, the first
reasoned distinction between void and voidable marriages was drawn
by Sir James Wilde (afterwards Lord Penzance) in 1868 in A . v . B .
(1868), L .R. 1 P & D, at p . 561 . What is lacking, however, is any suggestion that the distinction between a void and voidable marriage has
any bearing on the jurisdiction of the court.
The most unfortunate result of Ross Smith v. Ross Smith is
undoubtedly the acceptance by the House of Lords of the relevance
for the purpose of jurisdiction of the distinction between void and
voidable marriages that had been rejected in the Ramsay-Fairfax
case . Thus, today in England this distinction is relevant when the
basis of jurisdiction is the locus celebrationis and not when it is
the residence of the parties. As a result of the decision of the House
of Lords, Ramsay-Fairfax must be interpreted within narrow
limits .
In Canada it is interesting to note that in Steele v. Steele,"
Bissett J . of the Nova Scotia Court for Divorce and Matrimonial
Causes, preferred to follow the decision of the Court of Appeal"
and held that celebration of a marriage in the province is sufficient
to confer jurisdiction to annul a voidable marriage.
To conclude it is suggested that the distinction between void
51
64

Ibid., at pp. 376, 377 .
[1961] 1 All E .R . 255 .

51

(1964), 43 D .L.R . (2d) 57 (N.S .).
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and voidable marriages has no bearing on the jurisdiction of the
court and that the doctrine of the majority of the House of Lords
in the Ross Smith case should be rejected in Canada ." The rule
adopted in the Ranisay-Fairfax case, which bases jurisdiction on
the residence of the parties, has already been accepted in British
Columbia." On the other hand the ratio decidendi of the De
Reneville case, if incorporated in the rules ofjurisdiction applicable
in nullity cases in British Columbia, would be most beneficial and
in conformity with logic and historical tradition. What really
matters in nullity suits involving a foreign element is whether or
not the court seized with the case will apply the proper law. In the
common-law provinces if the ground of annulment is lack of formality, this issue should be determined in accordance with the lex
loci celebrationis; if any other basis for relief is alleged, the issue
should be determined in accordance with the personal law or laws
of the parties at the time of marriage . Liberalization of jurisdictional rules is dangerous only where the substantive law of the
forum is applied as a matter of course . Why place needless restrictions upon the right of a party to claim matrimonial relief? The
bases of jurisdiction could be multiplied if the application of the
proper law were insisted upon . Of course, there will not always be a
consistent choice of law in the various jurisdictions of the world
although in practice the number of connecting factors is rather
limited. For this reason and for reasons of convenience to the partties and in the interest of administration of justice some sensible
limitations must be placed upon the number of courts that can
exercise jurisdiction to grant nullity decrees. The jurisdiction of the
British Columbia court in nullity of marriage proceedings as enunciated by the Court of Appeal in Shaw v. Shaw and Gower v.
Starret could be slightly modified to read as follows :
The court has jurisdiction to annul a marriage whether it is
alleged to be void or voidable if: 11
1 . Either party is domiciled in British Columbia at the commencement of the proceedings."
ss Especially in view of the fact that the British Columbia court must
conform as closely as possible to the principles and rules acted upon by
the ecclesiastical courts in England. In Shaw v. Shaw, supra, footnote 2,
Sidney Smith 7.A. said at p. 178 (D .L.R .), referring to English cases :
"The decisions in these cases are of course not binding upon us, and this
court will not follow them unless in its opinion they correctly express the
law ."
as Whitaker v. McNellly (1957-58), 23 W.W .R. 210, 11 D.L.R . (2d)
90 (B .C .).
5' Modifications in italics . For a proposal in England see Report of the
Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce, 1956 Cmd. 9678 .
51 See Salvesen v. Austrian Property Administrator, supra, footnote 4 ;
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2. The respondent is resident in British Columbia at the commencement of the proceedings."
3. The marriage was celebrated in British Columbia."
This proposal embodies the views expressed by Manson J. in
Khan v. Khan with respect to marriages void ab initio and extends
them to cover voidable marriages."
Until the British Columbia Court of Appeal or eventually the
Supreme Court of Canada, determines once and for all the bases
of jurisdiction of the court in nullity suits, controversies on the
subject are likely to continue. Lawyers in British Columbia are now
faced with a number of seemingly conflicting Supreme Court decisions that call for prompt solution if hardship for petitioners is
to be avoided. As for the rest of Canada, the picture is even more
confusing." The best approach would undoubtedly be for Barlia-

De Reneville v . De Reneville, supra, footnote 25 ; Kahn v. Kahn, supra,
footnote 8 ; Solomon v . Walters (1956), 3 D .L .R. (2d) 78 (B .C.) ; also
Sheppard v. Sheppard, [1947] 2 W.W .R. 826 (B .C.) ; Gill v . Gill, [1927] 2
W .W.R. 761 (B .C.) ; and Finlay v . Boettner, [1948] 1 D .L.R . 39 (Alta.)
(domicile of plaintiff) ; Bevand v . Bevand, [1955] 1 D.L.R . 854 (N.S .) .
Note that the distinction between void and voidable marriages is still
relevant for determining the domicile of the petitioning wife or at least
until British Columbia adopts the Uniform Domicile Code (1961), see
Proceedings of 43rd Annual Meeting of the Conference of Commissioners
on Uniformity of Legislation in Canada, p . 139 . Note also that whether
the marriage is void or voidable depends upon the particular defect
alleged by the petitioner if recognized by the proper law as a ground of
nullity .
ss Ramsay-Fairfax v . Ramsay-Fairfax, supra, footnote 5 ; Whitaker v.
McNeilly, supra, footnote 53 . Purdy v . Purdy, [191912 W.W .R . 551 (B .C .)
seems to be overruled. Cf. Adelman v ., Adelman, [1948] 1 W .W .R. 1071
(Alta .) .
so Gower v . Starret, supra, footnote 3 ; see also Reid v . Francis, [1929]
3 W .W.R . 102 (Sask . C .A .) ; Bevand v . Bevand, supra, footnote 56 ; Hinds
v . McDonald, [193211 D .L .R . 96 (N .S .) ; Spencer v . Ladd, [1948] 1 D .L .R .
39 (Alta .) ; G . v . G., [1928] 1 W .W.R. 651 (Sask.) .
ex It is unfortunate that for constitutional reasons (see s. 91 (26) of
the B .N.A . Act, 30 & 31 Vict ., c . 3) the Legislature of the Province of
British Columbia cannot add a section to the Divorce and Matrimonial
Causes Act, supra, footnote 34, that would cover specifically the cases in
which the courts of that province have jurisdiction to annul a marriage.
Note that in LeBlanc v . LeBlanc, [1955] 1 D .L.R . 676, the Nova Scotia
Court for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes applied The Divorce Jurisdiction Act 1930, R .S .C ., 1952, c. 84, to proceedings brought by a deserted wife for the annulment of a voidable marriage . It is submitted that this
is wrong as the Act deals with jurisdiction for the purpose of divorce only.
In Abate v . Abate, [1961] 2 W .L.R . 221, the court applying Armitage
v . Attorney-General, [1906] P . 135, held that the principle that the English
courts will recognize as valid a decree of divorce obtained in a State where
the husband was not domiciled, if the courts of his domicile would recognize the validity of the decree applies also to foreign nullity decrees .
See also Gr. D . Kennedy, Recognition of Foreign Divorce and Nullity
Decrees (1957), 35 Can Bar Rev. 628.
12 For a survey see Castel, Private International Law (1960), p . 110
et seq. ; Cartwright, Lovekin, The Law and Practice of Divorce in Canada
(3rd ed ., 1962), p . 44, et seq ; Power, The Law and Practice Relating to
Divorce (1948), p . 136 et seq .
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ment to adopt a uniform federal law on the subject as was done in
the field of divorce in 1930 when the Divorce Jurisdiction Act was
passed ."
J.-G. C.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SALES TAX ON INTERPROVINCIAL TRANSACTIONS-COLLECTION FROM NON-RESIDENT RETAILERS-RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF TAX CLAIMS .- Nothing is quite so ap-

pealing to today's financially pressed provincial governments as a
high-yield, low-rate tax which its residents quickly accept as one
of the myriad costs of everyday living and so, presumably, just as
quickly forget . This helps to explain the fact that a retail sales tax
is today imposed by eight of the ten provinces at a rate offrom three
percent to six percent and accounts for fifteen point seven percent
-some $528 million-of total provincial revenues ." The move by
the provinces towards a sales tax was a response to the financial
difficulties created by the depression and the demand for relief
from other taxes, particularly those on property." But two factors
-the uncertainty as to the constitutional validity of the tax and
substantial aid from the federal government-slowed the introduction of the tax to the extent that only Quebec and Saskatchewan
have sales taxes of pre-war vintage while those of British Columbia,
Ontario, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island and
Newfoundland, have been introduced since 1947.
The right of the provinces to raise revenue is derived from
sections 92(2) and (9) of the British North America Act, 1867 .
In so far as the sales tax is concerned the relevant section is section
63
Another solution is to amend the B .N .A . Act so as to give back to
the provinces the power to legislate in the field of marriage and divorce
as requested by some groups in Quebec . This would enable each province
to effectuate badly needed reforms in this area of the law. There is also
no reason why two federal laws should not be passed, one dealing with
marriage and divorce in the common-law provinces and one in the Province of Quebec .
'This is a revised version of a paper given at the 1963 meeting of the
Canadian Tax Foundation .
z Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Provincial Estimates for 1963-64 .
This figure includes only the "general" retail sales tax and does not include
the sales tax on alcoholic beverages, amusements and admissions, motor
fuel and fuel oil, and tobacco, which taken together would account for
another $572 million annually. The Dominion Bureau of Statistics estimates that sales taxes will yield a total of $1 .1 billion for the provinces in
fiscal 1964, providing 33 % of total revenue and 50 % of all provincial tax
revenue . In the ten year period 1953-1963 the general sales tax has climbed
from 8 % to 15 % of total provincial revenues.
a
Due, Provincial Retail Sales Taxes in Canada, Canadian Tax papers
No. 1, Canadian Tax Foundation (1951) .

